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RAPE REFORM LEGISLATION:
IS IT THE SOLUTION?*
F ORCIBLE RAPE IS ONE OF THE MOST rapidly increasing crimes of violence
in the United States.' Figures released by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation indicate that there was an eleven percent increase in violent
crime in this country in 1974,2 and within this group, a nine percent in-
crease in forcible rape. Yet with the incidence of rape reaching dramatic
proportions,4 less than fourteen percent of the reported rapes are success-
fully prosecuted.5
Part of the blame for the failure to successfully prosecute rape cases can
be attributed to the failure of our criminal justice system - a failure ad-
mitted by Attorney General Edward H. Levi in a memorandum accom-
panying the 1974 Preliminary Annual Release of the Uniform Crime Re-
port:
These figures represent a dismal and tragic failure on the part
of our present system of criminal justice ....
We must understand that an effective criminal justice sys-
tem has to emphasize deterrence. There are many causes of
crime, but among them is the failure of our system to move
quickly and effectively to detect and punish offenders.6
Others, however, point specifically to the antiquated rape statutes
that presently exist in most states as being a major part of the problem
and argue that the statutes provide little protection for the victim while
in effect, acting as a deterrent to effective prosecution. This is the result
Editor's note: Special acknowledgment is extended to the Women's Caucus of the
Cleveland State University College of Law for the use of its facilities and for the funds
which permitted the undertaking of this study. Unless otherwise indicated, miscella-
neous materials cited herein are on file at the Cleveland State University Law Library.
' Forcible rape as used in this study refers to vaginal intercourse between a male and
female, and anal intercourse, fellatio and cunnilingus, between persons regardless of sex,
with another not the spouse of the offender when either of the following applies: (1)
the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force,
or (2) for the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially impairs the
other's judgment or control by administering any drug or intoxicant to the other person,
surreptitiously or by force, threat of force or deception. Statutory rape will not be
treated.
2 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1974 Preliminary Annual
Release, March 31, 1975). Violent crimes include: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
Id. The FBI has defined forcible rape as "carnal knowledge of a female through the
use of force or the threat of force." FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 13 (1973). These statistics include attempts to commit forcible rape but exclude
statutory rape without force and male rape.
4 Id. Forcible rape offenses in 1973 increased 10% over 1972 and 62% over 1968.
5 Id. at 15.
6 FBI Press Release (March 31, 1975).
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of statutes so inadequately drafted by the legislatures7 that judicial deci-
sions must be based on case law and a tradition which looks upon the
testimony of rape victims with suspicion.' Proponents of this argument
conclude that the solution to the problem lies with the legislatures and
requires the enactment of sweeping rape reform legislation.9 A few
states, including Ohio, 10 have already adopted some reform legislation."
In order to evaluate rape reform legislation we will compare the new
statutes with the old, critically analyze reform legislation, present argu-
ments both in support of and against various aspects of rape reform
legislation, and estimate the effect on the rape problem that such legisla-
tion is likely to have.
I. OHIO LAW PRIon TO REFORM
In enacting its new criminal code which became effective January 1,
1974, the Ohio legislature dramatically changed its approach to sexual
offenses.' 2 It recognized that any type of sexual activity between con-
senting adults in private is not a crime and focused its attention on sexual
activity carrying a significant risk of harming or affronting others.'
3
It further demonstrated legislative sophistication by discarding distinc-
tions of sex between offender and victim.' 4 These changes were all uti-
lized in drafting Ohio's new rape statute.' 5
7 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3151 (1964).
8 3A J. WIcMoRE, EVIDENCE 9 924a (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
Among the proponents of rape reform legislation are the Michigan Women's Task Force
on Rape, the National Organization of Women, and the American Bar Association.
I0 Ohio Am. Sub. S.B. 144 was signed into law by Governor James A. Rhodes on August 27,
1975, effective immediately [hereinafter referred to as "Ohio Bill"].
See CAL. EvIn. CODE ANN. § 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
13961.5 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1127d, 1127e (West Supp.
1975); Colo. H.B. 1042 (enacted July 1, 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (Supp.
1975); Hawaii H.B. 106 (enacted May 14, 1975); II1. H.B. 271 (enacted August 26,
1975); Ill. H.B. 278 (enacted August 26, 1975); !OWA CODE ANN. §9 782.3, .4 (Supp.
1975); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, [1975]
Minn. Laws 1084; Nev. A.B. 664 (enacted May 21, 1975); Nev. S.B. 52 (enacted May 20,
1975); Nev. S.B. 222 (enacted May 20, 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-9-20 to -26
(interim Supp. 1975); Ohio Am. Sub. S.B. 144 (enacted August 27, 1975); Ore. H.B.
2241 (enacted July 1, 1975); Ore. H.B. 2242 (enacted July 3, 1975); ch. 203, [19751
Tex. Laws 476; ch. 14 [1975] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 171.
12 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 99 2907 et seq. (Page 1975).
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 99 2907 et seq., Committee Comment (Page 1975).
14 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (A), (B), (D) (Page 1975).
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Page 1975) provides:
(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of
the offender, when any of the following apply:
(1) The offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or
threat of force.
(2) For the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially
impairs the other person's judgment or control by administering any drug or
intoxicant to the other person, surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or
deception.
(3) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the
offender knows the age of such person.
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Rape as it is now defined in Ohio incorporates the common law def-
inition16 but expands the traditional concept of rape to include oral and
anal sex as well as homosexual and lesbian assaults.' 7 In addition, the
purposeful drugging of the victim or rendering the victim intoxicated in
order to perpetrate rape has been proscribed as criminal activity by the
statute.'
8
This redefinition of rape reflects the intent of the legislature not only
to clarify the criminal law but also to establish reasonable guidelines
for the courts in their exercise of judicial discretion. For example, al-
though under former law rape was a non-probationary offense,' 9 rape of-
fenders are now eligible for probation subject to the application by the
courts of detailed criteria in determining such eligibility.2 0 An exception
is made in the case of repeat offenders who are still not eligible for pro-
bation. 21
Despite the well-intentioned efforts of the legislature to clarify the law
concerning rape, these efforts failed to deal with several critical aspects
of the rape problem. These include: the necessity of proving resistance;
the admissibility of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with per-
sons other than the accused; and the requirement of corroborative testi-
mony. Ohio statutes have never addressed themselves to these issues;
consequently, judicial determinations have frequently been constrained
within the bounds of the statutory framework. Other Ohio courts have
overcome the statutory limitations by utilizing the "expansiveness of
the common law," but for the most part the courts have had to define
the law without the benefit of legislative guidance aided only by prior
case law. As far back as 1861, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a case in-
volving an attempt to rape a nine-year-old child, expressed its dismay at
the statutory constraint:
No act or omission, however hurtful or immoral in its tenden-
cies, is punishable as a crime in Ohio, unless such act or omis-
sion is specially enjoined or prohibited by the statute laws of the
state. It is, therefore, idle to speculate upon the injurious conse-
quences of permitting such conduct to go unpunished, or to re-
gret that our criminal code has not the expansiveness of the
common law. 22
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of rape, a felony of the first degree.
If the offender under division (A) (3) of this section purposely compels the
victim to submit by force or threat of force, whoever violates division (A) (3) of
this section shall be imprisoned for life.
1 At common law rape was defined as the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by a
man forcibly and against her will.
'7 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (A) (Page 1975). See also note 15, supra.
'8 See note 15, supra.
' OiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.04 (Page 1954).
20 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02 (Page 1975).
21 Omio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2951.02 (F) (2), 2929.01 (Page 1975).
22 Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466, 469 (1861).
1975]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Resistance, though not an element of the crime of rape, has almost
always been used by the courts as a factor determinative of lack of con-
sent. The question has been how much resistance must be exerted to
negative consent with various courts applying various standards. One of
the earliest standards defined by an Ohio court is found in State v. La-
bus:
2 3
The force and violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative
term, depending upon the age, size and strength of the parties
and their relation to each other; . . . the same degree of force
and violence would not be required upon a person of such tender
years, as would be required were the parties more nearly equal
in age, size and strength.24
Though following the "relative" standard of State v. Labus, the court
in State v. Colucci25 expanded the standard to include submission
through fear of personal violence. It was also recognized in State v.
Martin"5 that resistance can be overcome by terror or by fear of great
bodily injury or harm. In this case, the court held that the guilt of the ac-
cused was established beyond a reasonable doubt despite the fact that
"the victim might have used greater physical resistance or cried out
.... -27 The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Schwab has gone even
farther in recognizing that resistance need not be proved where "consent
has been induced or the opposition prevented, by fears of personal vio-
lence . . . '"28
There is in general a notable paucity of case law in Ohio dealing
with rape, particularly on the issue of the admissibility of evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct. The law in Ohio on this subject was first
articulated in 1858 in McCombs v. State29 and was reiterated four years
later in McDermott v. State.30  The McCombs decision stated the rule
to be:
23 102 Ohio St. 26, 130 N.E. 161 (1921).
24 Id. at 38-39, 130 N.E. at 164.
25 27 Ohio L. Abs. 509, 514 (Ohio App. 1938). The following charge was made to the
jury:
You are instructed that the allegation of force is proved by evidence which shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person of the complaining witness wvas
violated and her resistence overcome by physical force, or that her will was
overcome by fear or duress. In either case the crime would be complete
though she ceased all resistance before the act was actually consummated.
Where a female submits to sexual intercourse through fear of personal violence,
such intercourse is not with her consent, and the crime is complete. The
woman is bound to resist if manual resistance is possible, or unless sucb resis-
tance is overcome by fear or by threats. If she remains passive, her passiveness
is to be taken as consent. Id. at 514.
26 77 Ohio App. 553, 68 N.E.2d 807 (1946).
27 Id. at 554, 68 N.E.2d at 808. See also State v. Wolfenberger, 106 Ohio App. 322, 154
N.E.2d 774 (1958).
21 109 Ohio St. 532, 539, 143 N.E. 29, 31 (1924).
29 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858).
30 13 Ohio St. 332 (1862).
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The character for chastity of the prosecutrix . . . can not be im-
peached by evidence of particular acts of unchastity, but only
by evidence of her reputation in that respect. Nor can she be
interrogated as to previous criminal intercourse with persons
other than the accused himself; nor is such evidence of other
instances admissable.31
After citing its previous decision in McCombs, the Supreme Court of
Ohio in McDermott v. State explained the rationale for excluding such
evidence:
It by no means follows, that a desire to have sexual intercourse
with one person, tends, legitimately, to prove a willingness to
have like intercourse with another and different person. In-
deed, the reverse is much the most probable; but, however this
may be, the introduction of such proof is opposed to the well-
settled rules of evidence.3
Although these decisions were reached over a hundred years ago, they
have yet to be reaffirmed, questioned or rejected.
Under the common law, the corroboration requirement for a charge of
rape did not exist 33 and as with the previously discussed aspects of rape,
Ohio follows the common law. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Tut-
tle34 held that it was error to instruct the jury in a case of statutory
rape that it is unsafe to convict upon the testimony of the victim alone
without other reliable corroborative evidence.35 This position has been
adhered to so consistently by the Ohio courts that the statutory confirma-
tion of the common law rule has been viewed as unnecessary.
As shown above, the Ohio courts have approached three critical as-
pects of the rape problem in a manner reflective of an unsophisticated
understanding of the more complex ramifications of this crime. But the
courts alone cannot be held accountable for failing to address other criti-
cal areas. Such issues as the definition of spouse, the availability of medi-
cal care for rape victims,. the withholding of victims' names from the media
and the establishing of sentencing provisions require legislative action.
Only within the past year has the Ohio legislature been willing to recog-
nize the breadth of the rape problem and to initiate statutory reform.
II. OHIo REFORM LEGISLATION
Interested groups concerned with the present rape crisis and advocat-
ing legislative reform as the answer to this crisis were confronted by two
major problems. The first was that several aspects of rape had not been
11 8 Ohio St. at 646-47 (1858).
32 13 Ohio St. at 334 (1862).
33 7 J. WmIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061 (3d ed. 1940).
34 67 Ohio St. 440, 66 N.E. 524 (1902).
35 Id. at 442, 66 N.E. at 525. The court also held that finding the victim of a rape to be an
accomplice would "thwart" the purpose of the law.
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specifically dealt with statutorily but had only been treated by the courts
relying on the common law. The solution to this problem, however, re-
quired only codification of existing case law. The second problem was
more acute. Proponents of reform were concerned with concepts of rape
that had never before been considered by either the Ohio legislature or
the courts. It was incumbent upon the proponents to incorporate these
concepts within a workable legal framework. Their task was somewhat
simplified by the sophisticated approach used in drafting the sex offenses
chapter31 of the 1974 revision of the Ohio Criminal Code. Nonetheless,
initiating reform in any aspect of the law is never easy.
These efforts resulted in the enactment of Senate Bill 144 by the
111th Ohio General Assembly.3 7  The amendments to existing rape
law38 included in this bill are the following:
1. The term spouse is defined to mean one presently married to
an offender at the time of the alleged offense with the following ex-
ceptions: (1) when the parties have entered into a written separation
pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code; (2) when an action for annulment,
divorce, dissolution or alimony is pending; (3) when the action is for
alimony, after the effective date of the judgment. 39
2. The victim need not prove resistance.
40
3. In prosecutions for rape, evidence of specific instances of the
victim's "sexual conduct," 4' and opinion and reputation evidence of
the victim's prior sexual conduct is inadmissible with two exceptions:
evidence of the origin of semen and evidence of the victim's prior sex-
ual conduct with the offender.4 2 These two evidential exceptions are
admissible, if the court at a hearing in chambers 43 finds such evidence
to be "material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory
or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value." 44  The
hearing in chambers to determine the admissibility of such evidence
shall be held at or prior to the preliminary hearing but not less than three
days before trial or during trial for good cause. 45 At any hearing or
proceeding at which the admissibility of evidence is to be determined
the victim may be represented by counsel. 46 In the event of indigency
36 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907 et seq. (Page 1975).
37 See note 10, supra.
38 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 et seq. (Page 1975).
3' Ohio Bill § 2907.01(L).
40 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(C).
41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A) (Page 1975) defines "sexual conduct" as
vaginal intercourse between a male and female, and anal intercourse, fellatio,
and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
42 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(D).
4' Ohio Bill § 2907.02(E).
44 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(D).
15 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(E).
46 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(F).
[Vol. 24:463
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss3/6
RAPE REFORM LEGISLATION
or inability to obtain counsel, the court upon request shall appoint
counsel without cost to the victim.
47
Evidence of specific instances of the defendant's sexual activity
and opinion and reputation evidence of the defendant's sexual activity
is inadmissible subject to the same exceptions applicable to the victim's
sexual conduct with an additional exception, proof of motive or intent
pursuant to section 2945.59 of the Ohio Revised Code.48 Such evi-
dence may be admissible if a determination of materiality is made at
an in chambers hearing as described above.49 The right of the state
or the defense to impeach the victim's credibility is not limited by this
section. 50
4. Persons convicted of rape as a second or subsequent offense
are mandatorily sentenced to actual incarceration for a minimum
period of five years. 51 A second or subsequent offense as used in the
Bill means that prior to the present conviction, the offender has been
convicted for violating the Ohio rape statute or a substantially similar
statute of any other state or the United States.5 2 Actual incarcera-
tion is defined as requiring imprisonment for a stated period, notwith-
standing any provisions to the contrary in existing law concerning
suspension of sentence, probation, shock probation, parole, and shock
parole.53 The exceptions to the "actual incarceration" requirement
are reduction of sentence for good behavior and suspension of sen-
tence during indefinite commitment to a mental institution. 54
5. Upon the request of either the victim or offender, the court
shall order the suppression of the names of both the victim and offender
and the details of the alleged crime until the preliminary hearing, the
accused is arraigned, the charge is dismissed, or the case is otherwise
concluded, whichever occurs first.55 - This section does not deny to
either party the name and address of the other party or the details of
the alleged offense. 56
6. Any costs incurred by a hospital or other emergency medical
facility for conducting a medical examination of a rape victim for the
purpose of gathering physical evidence for possible prosecution shall
be paid by the county if a county facility, by the municipality if a
municipal facility, or by the municipality in which the offense was
committed if a private facility . 5  All hospitals within the state of
47 Id.
48 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(D).
49 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(E).
50 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(D).
11 Ohio Bill § 2907.10(A).
52 Id.
' Ohio Bill § 2908.10(B).
54 Id.
55 Ohio Bill § 2907.11.
56 Id.
51 Ohio Bill § 2907.28.
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Ohio with emergency room facilities shall provide on-call physician
service twenty-four hours a day for the examination of rape victims.58
Such examinations shall be made upon the request of any peace of-
ficer or prosecutor with the victim's consent or upon the request of
the victim.59 The attending hospital shall provide the victim with
information of all available venereal disease, pregnancy and psychiatric
services. 6° A minor may consent to a physical examination for rape,
such consent not being subject to disaffirmance because of minority.6'
Consent of the parent or guardian of a minor rape victim is not re-
quired for such an examination nor is the parent or guardian liable
for payment for any services provided without their consent.
62
7. Any unauthorized insertion of an instrument, apparatus or other
object into the vaginal or anal cavity of a person not the spouse of the
offender when the offender compels submission by force or threat of
force or when the offender prevents resistance by administering a
drug or intoxicant by force, threat of force or deception shall consti-
tute felonious sexual penetration, a felony of the first degree.
63
These newly enacted provisions of the Ohio rape law represent the major
areas of concern to proponents of rape reform legislation throughout the
United States. Accordingly, this note will focus on these issues and the
issue of requiring corroboration of the rape victim's testimony, a subject
of great controversy which was deleted from the originally proposed Ohio
legislation. The following comparative analysis will examine, with the
aid of the views of interested individuals and groups, not only newly en-
acted reform legislation, but also rape law as it still exists in the majority
of states.
III. DEFINITION OF SPOUSE
Historically a husband has been presumed to be incapable of raping
his wife. The classical statement of this presumption is found in Lord
Hale's treatise of 1847:
But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by him-
self upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial con-
sent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract.
6 4
Although Hale cited no other authority for his proposition, it was readily
adopted as the law on the subject. The first indication of disagreement
55 Ohio Bill § 2907.29.
59 Id.
I0 d.
61 Id.
62 Id.
13 Ohio Bill § 2907.12. This section adds a new crime to the Sex Offenses Chapter of the
Ohio Criminal Code.
14 1 M. HALE, THE HisrORy OF THE PLEAS OF ThE CROWN § 629 (1847).
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with Hale's rule appeared by way of dicta in Regina v. Clarence,65
where judges expressed the view that the consent given by the wife at
marriage could, in some circumstances, be revoked. It was not until
1949 in Rex v. Clarke66 that one such circumstance was recognized,
namely that consent to marital intercourse was revoked by a decree of
judicial separation. This decision was soon qualified in Regina v.
Miller" which held that a mere filing for divorce did not revoke marital
consent nor erase the husband's immunity from a charge of raping his
wife.
Marriage as a defense against charges of rape was first articulated in
the United States by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in dicta in
Commonwealth v. Fogerty.68 The court stated that the defense was valid
even when the husband and wife were no longer cohabitating and found
that physical separation did not revoke consent.6 9  Although a subse-
quent case held that divorce revoked the marital contract and destroyed
the wife's implied consent to marital intercourse, 70 the decision does not
represent the recognition of a circumstance in which a husband can be
found guilty of the rape of his wife, but rather, acknowledges that a di-
vorce nullifies the marriage.
Although American courts have persisted in following the rule that a
husband is legally incapable of raping his wife, they have found that he
may be convicted for the rape of his wife. A husband who aids or abets,
assists or forces another to have sexual intercourse with his wife, or
forces her to submit to sexual intercourse with another can be held guilty
of rape."' Even in circumstances where the husband has intercourse with
his wife concomitant with aiding and abetting her rape by another party,
courts will find him guilty only by reason of his aiding and abetting and
not by reason of his having had intercourse with her.72  Thus it appears
65 22 Q.B.D. 23 (1889). Implied consent of marriage does not extend to infection with
syphilis or gonorrhea. American decisions have held qualified consent to apply only
to healthful intercourse, and husbands have been found guilty of (sexual) criminal
battery. See State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102 A. 63 (1917); 18 COLUM. L. REV. 81
(1918). See also Trammell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S.W. 79 (1900); State v.
Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 43 S.W. 1095 (1897) (dissenting opinion).
66 2 All E.R. 448 (1949).
67 2 Q.B. 282 (1954).
61 74 Mass. 489 (1857).
6'9 Id. See Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905). See also Comment,
Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1954).
'0 State v. Parsons, 285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926).
rl See Elliott v. State, 190 Ga. 803, 10 S.E.2d 843 (1940); People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d
464, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963); State v. Martin, 17 N.C. App. 317, 194 S.E.2d 60 (1973);
Cody v. State, 376 P.2d 625 (Okla. Crim. 1962); State v. Blackwell, 241 Ore. 528, 407
P.2d 617 (1965).
72 See Bohanon v. State, 289 P.2d 400 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955), wherein the husband
threatened to kill the wife and their three children unless she submitted to the third
person, tore off her clothes, threw her on the bed, watched his friend have intercourse
with her despite her protests and then had intercourse with her himself; State v. Drope,
462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971), wherein the husband cooperating with four other men
tied his wife to a bed, held a gun to her head while each of the others bad intercourse
with her, and then had forcible intercourse with her himself.
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that courts will adhere to the consent theory even where the facts indicate
that the wife's consent was unlikely. 3
Discontent with this state of the law has resulted in the statutory redef-
inition of spouse. Since 1973, ten states have enacted statutes that re-
voke the immunity of the husband from charges of rape when the spouses
are living apart under a decree of judicial separation7 1 or are living apart
and either have filed for judicial separation or divorce. 75 During the
past year, New Mexico adopted an even more restrictive definition of
spouse and now defines spouse as "a legal husband or wife, unless the
couple is living apart or either husband or wife has filed for separate
maintenance or divorce." 76 (Emphasis added.) Therefore, merely living
apart is sufficient to revoke the spousal immunity.
To the same effect is the Colorado definition which excludes spouses
living apart with the intent to do so, whether or not pursuant to a decree
of judicial separation. 77  Whereas Washington in enacting rape reform
legislation defined "married" persons as those legally married,'8 Minne-
sota included in its definition of spouse "adults cohabiting in an ongoing
voluntary sexual relationship at the time of the alleged offense." 9 Ohio's
unique definition excludes parties who have entered into a written separa-
tion agreement pursuant to Ohio law and also parties who are involved
in an action for annulment, divorce, dissolution of marriage or alimony.80
Yet despite the movement toward liberalization of this feature of the rape
laws, Indiana is presently considering the enactment of a statute which
would incorporate the common law theory of implied consent upon mar-
riage.8
The common law definition of spouse applied in most states rests on
the theory that the husband has a property interest in his wife. This
theory views the wife as subject to her husband. Such a concept does
not reflect the present day approach to marriage as a contract between
equal partners. Sexual intercourse between equal partners implies a vol-
untary consent to each act and negates an absolute contractual obligation.
Proponents of the redefinition of spouse argue that the criminal law
71 See State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971); Bohanon v. State, 289 P.2d 400
(Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
74 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010 (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (1974); MONT.
REV. CoDEs ANN. § 94-5-503, -506(2) (1973); ch. 241, § 2 [1973] N.M. Laws, as amended
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-20(E) (interim Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (2)
(1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3103 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1973).
11 Micti. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520 (1) (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 10, [1975] Minn. Laws
1089; Nev. S.B. 52 § 2 (enacted May 20, 1975).
71 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A 9-20(E) (interim Supp. 1975).
17 Colo. H.B. 1042 § 18-3409(2) (enacted July 1, 1975).
78 Ch. 14, § 1, [1975] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 171.
79 Ch. 374, § 10, [1975] Minn. Laws 1089.
80 Ohio Bill § 2907.01 (L).
81 Proposed Ind. Penal Code Final Draft § 35-12.1-4-1 (October 1974). The comment
following the proposed statute states at 88: "The implied consent of the marriage has
been incorporated into this section so that a spouse cannot physically rape his partner."
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should not discriminate against married women as a class. 82  They
claim that the law's refusal to recognize the possibility of a husband rap-
ing his wife violates the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution:
The same facts of criminal behavior could occur in two separate
instances, but while rape would exist in the instance where there
was no marital bond, it would not exist in the other solely due to
the fact of a legal bond of marriage.8 3
It is further argued that the state has an inherent interest in protecting
not only the general welfare of society but also the integrity of the individ-
ual. Although there is a societal interest in protecting the marital rela-
tionship, there is an equal interest in safeguarding the individual from
acts of violence. Both interests must be considered in the determination
of legislative policy. Under present law the integrity of the individual is
subjugated to the societal interest in protecting marital privacy.
Opponents agree that wives should be protected by the criminal law
from forcible sexual intercourse, but contend that "rape is a category ill-
suited to marriage."8 4  The usual problems of proof are magnified
when a wife accuses her husband of rape for it is difficult to determine
whether consent once given, in a specific instance has been revoked.
Accordingly, it is claimed that courts and legislatures are justified in
their reluctance to include within the definition of rape sexual intercourse
between spouses.
There is, it is alleged, a compelling societal interest in protecting the
institution of marriage. Such an interest requires that legislative policy
encourage reconciliation even in those instances where the parties have
separated or have filed for separation or divorce. A redefinition of
spouse to allow for rape between married persons in such circumstances
could discourage reconciliation and prevent the restoration of vitality to the
marriage. Even where it is apparent that reconciliation will not occur
opponents fear the use of rape charges as a means of blackmail.8 5
Although opponents fear that the redefinition of spouse represents a
threat to the institution of marriage, it must be kept in mind that the re-
definition of spouse has no effect on a viable, ongoing marriage. The fo-
cus of reform legislation on this topic is the protection of spouses who
although no longer a part of an ongoing marriage are nonetheless still
12 See Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape, Background Material for a Proposal for
Criminal Code Reform to Respond to Michigan's Rape Crisis 12 [hereinafter cited as
Michigan Women's Task Force].
s3 Id. at 11-12.
14 Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 725
(1954).
85 Where there has once been love, there is reason to suspect that it will be re-
placed by hatred rather than indifference. A wife who is willing to prod the state
into beginning a felony prosecution against her husband is unlikely to recollect
objectively. There also is the possibility that she may use the threat of prosecu-
tion to force her husband to agree to an unfavorable property settlement. Id.
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legally bound by the implied consent of the marriage contract. There is
no reason why a spouse who has not only indicated an intention to termi-
nate the marriage but also has taken formal steps to do so should be re-
quired to submit to unwanted sexual intercourse because of the archaic
concept of implied consent.
IV. RESISTANCE
As rape is defined in most states the act must be forcible and against
the will of the victim. Although resistance has never been an element
of the crime, many courts have seized upon it as the outward manifesta-
tion of nonconsent8 6 Resistance has been used to establish two essen-
tial elements of the crime: force and nonconsent8 s These elements must
be demonstrated except in cases where the victim is non compos or is
otherwise mentally or physically incapacitated. 88
The basic question facing the courts with regard to resistance is how
much resistance negatives consent. This quantitative question has been a
major source of disagreement and has resulted in the formulation of
numerous resistance standards. It has been generally held that resistance
by mere words is not enough; it must be accompanied by acts.89 The
most rigid standard is that which requires "utmost resistance." The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase as requiring
the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty
within the woman's power to resist the penetration of her per-
son, and this must be shown to persist until the offense is con-
summated.90
Other authorites, however, refuse to require this degree of opposition:
While it may be expected in such cases from the nature of the
crime that the utmost resistance would be manifested, and the
utmost resistance made which the circumstances of a particular
case would allow, still, to hold as a matter of law that such man-
ifestation and resistance are essential to the existence of the
crime, so that the crime could not be committed if they were
wanting, would be going farther than any well-considered case
in criminal law has hitherto gone.9'
It is now generally recognized that resistance to rape is relative and that
a court must consider all the attending facts and circumstances: the age
86 Comment, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680 (1966).
87 2 F. BAILEY AND H. ROTHBLATT, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE § 432 (1973).
88 This incapacity includes the use of drugs or other intoxicants and instances in which
resistance is prevented through fear or threats of physical injury.
89 See Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644 (1897); State v. Risen, 192 Ore. 557, 235
P.2d 764 (1951).
90 Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 199, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (1906).
8" State v. Shields, 45 Conn. 256, 264 (1877).
[Vol. 24:463
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss3/6
RAPE REFORM LEGISLATION
of the victim, 92 the relative strength of the parties,9 3 the amount of
force exerted by the accused, 9 and the futility of resistance. 5 The
court must determine in light of the facts and circumstances of a partic-
ular case whether the degree of resistance exerted was reasonable and
adequate to negate consent,9  but it is well-established that the victim
of rape need not resist where such resistance would be futile and would
endanger her life. 7
In developing the resistance standard, courts have generally accepted
the view that yielding because of fear does not constitute voluntary con-
sent.98  It has been held that actual resistance is not required when be-
cause of fear resulting from threats of great bodily harm or death a wom-
an yields to her attacker.99 Again, however, there is disagreement among
the courts as to what constitutes sufficient fear to overcome or prevent
resistance. Some jurisdictions have adopted an objective standard as
stated in Farrar v. United States:0
Fear to be sufficient . . must be based upon something of
substance; and furthermore the fear must be of death or severe
bodily harm. A girl cannot simply say, "I was scared," and thus
transform an apparent consent into a legal non-consent which
makes the man's act a capital offense . . . . [H]er fear must be
not fanciful but substantial.10'
This objective standard of fear, however, is not generally accepted.
A variation of the objective standard enunciated in a number of juris-
dictions is a "paralyzing fear" standard. One of the most rigid inter-
pretations of the standard was that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court which
12 See Bulls v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 64, 241 P. 605 (1926); State v. Wamsley, 109
W.Va. 570, 156 S.E. 75 (1930).
93 See People v. Simental, 11 I11. App. 3d 537, 297 N.E.2d 356 (1973) (victim was four
feet eleven inches tall and weighed ninety-five pounds while her two assailants were
about five feet eleven inches tall and weighed one hundred eighty pounds each).
14 See King v. State, 210 Tenn. 150, 357 S.W.2d 42 (1962), wherein the court quotes from
1 A. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 639:
The degree of force required to constitute rape is relative depending upon the
particular circumstances but in any case it must be sufficient to subject and put
the dissenting woman within the power of the man and thus enable him to have
carnal knowledge of her notwithstanding good faith resistance on her part.
91 See People v. Browder, 21 I11. App. 3d 223, 315 N.E.2d 168 (1974); In re Price, 20
I11. App. 3d 357, 314 N.E.2d 235 (1974).
91 See Holmes v. State, 505 P.2d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
97 See People v. Browder, 21 Ill. App. 3d 223, 315 N.E.2d 168 (1974) (two women were
abducted at gunpoint by four men and assaulted sexually in a dark, vacant apartment
by fifteen or sixteen men); People v. Smith, 32 I11. 2d 88, 203 N.E.2d 879 (1965);
People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill. 2d 457, 185 N.E.2d 211 (1962).
98 See Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 518, 524, 7 N.W. 431, 433 (1880), wherein the court
quotes from Regina v. Day, 9 Carr and P. 722: "'There is a difference between consent
and submission. Every consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that
submission involves consent."
9 See State v. Campbell, 190 Neb. 22, 206 N.W.2d 53 (1973).
100 275 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
101 Id. at 876.
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required "a fear .. . so great as to terrify her and render her practi-
cally incapable of resistance.' '10 2 As applied, this standard excluded as a
victim of rape any person who was "fully cognizant of everything that
was going on, fully able to relate every detail thereof .... ."103 This
harsh standard, first articulated in 1938 and reaffirmed as recently as
1968,104 was rejected by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1971 when it
recognized that the test of a woman's will to resist is subjective and need
not be expressed in terms of incapacitating fear.'0 5 Specifically, the court
recognized that not every woman would respond to the threat of rape at
gunpoint with the same degree of fear; though one might be overcome by
incapacitating fear, another might not. 0 6 Thus, a person overcome by
incapacitating fear would not have to prove resistance, whereas another,
not easily frightened, would be required to do so. The law should apply
the same standard in either situation and should not require resistance
in any situation where a person is faced with an attack at the point of
a deadly weapon - the use of a gun is reason enough not to resist. 07
The Wisconsin subjective standard was further liberalized in Brown v.
State,l08 a case in which the victim was confronted with a weapon that
later turn out to be a water pistol. The court held:
[t]he . . .fear which renders the utmost resistance unnecessary
. . .need not necessarily be... "so extreme as to preclude
resistance," but may, in the exercise of "[c]ommon sense and
the experience of mankind," be prompted by the "strong motiva-
tion or belief" that survival demands submission. 0 9 (Footnotes
omitted.)
The trend in other jurisdictions has likewise been toward a liberalization
of the resistance standard. In general, recent cases have held that the
utmost resistance theory is "obsolete and outdated" and that the victim
need only show "that her resistance was genuine, active, and in good
faith."" 0
In an effort to clarify the confusion created by the application of
numerous resistance standards, three states have enacted reform legis-
lation."' The essence of the legislation in all three states is that the prose-
cution need not prove resistance in order to establish that a rape has
10'2 State v. Hoffman, 228 Wis. 235, 240, 280 N.W. 357, 359 (1938).
101 Id. at 244, 280 N.W. at 361.
104 State v. Muhammad, 41 Wis. 2d 12, 162 N.W.2d 567 (1968).
105 State v. Herfel, 49 Wis. 2d 513, 182 N.W.2d 232 (1971).
106 Id.
07 Id. at 519, 182 N.W.2d at 235. As the court noted: "The law does not require a woman
to become a martyr to test by resistance the sincerity of a threat to rape at gunpoint."
Id.
10O 59 Wis. 2d 200, 207 N.W.2d 602 (1973).
101 Id. at 212, 207 N.W.2d at 608.
110 See generally 2 F. BAILEY AND H. ROTHBLA-r, supra note 87, at 278.
"' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(i) (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975] Minn. Laws
1088; Ohio Bill § 2907.02(C).
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occurred. Several arguments have been advanced in support of this legis-
lation. The first of these deals with the subjectivity of the interpreta-
tion of statutory language as applied by the courts to individual fact situ-
ations. It is contended that because such statutory terms as "utmost
resistance" and "against the will" are not self-defining, courts in defining
them have injected their own subjective biases."' Another argument
advanced is that in all crimes of violence resistance on the part of the
victim alarms and angers the attacker. It follows that a person who at-
tempts to resist a rape attack is far more likely to be injured or killed
than a person who unwillingly submits. The elimination of the resistance
requirement would at the very minimum decrease the possibility that vio-
lence will be used to accomplish the intercourse. 1 3  It should not be
necessary for the victim to have to withstand further injury for the sole
purpose of proving a charge of rape. Finally, advocates say that the leg-
islatures must stop concentrating their attention on the victim's conduct
but rather should focus on the offender's criminal behavior.1 4 The pri-
mary concern should be "whether the offender's behavior was coercive
and violent; [and] whether the offender's power of execution of threats
was reasonably apparent to the victim."'" 5
While those protective of the victim's rights press for elimination of
the resistance requirement, those concerned with safeguarding the rights
of the accused urge reformulation of an objective resistance standard
which would eliminate conjecture and uncertainty." 6 It is argued that
the statutory language should make clear that the victim need not incur
serious risk of death or serious bodily injury and with equal consistency
ensure fair treatment of the defendant:
The standard must be high enough to assure that the resistance
is unfeigned and to indicate with some degree of certainty that
the woman's attitude was not one of ambivalence or unconscious
compliance and that her complaints do not result from moralistic
afterthoughts. It must be low enough to make death or serious
injury an unlikely outcome of the event. To demand that a
woman sacrifice her life to protect her virtue not only would
represent a misplaced sense of values but would also unjustly
112 Landau, Rape: The Victim as Defendant, 10 TRIAL, July/August 1974, at 19, 21.
They have tended to assess the conduct presented in individual cases by iea-
suring it against their view of -what an adult woman who did not want sexual
intercourse would have done under the given set of circumstances. Unfor-
tunately, this judicial view of the average woman frequently does not correspond
to the way in which real women actually respond to perceived dangers. As a
result, our appellate courts have frequently dealt in an unrealistic manner with
the actual events as experienced by a woman subjected to forcible intercourse.
Id. at 21.
13 Id. at 22.
114 Michigan Women's Task Force, supra note 82, at 6.
115 Id.
"I Comment, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680 (1966).
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raise an inference and an eyebrow whenever a raped woman
lived to tell the tale." 7
Obviously this proposed resistance standard does not eliminate conjec-
ture and uncertainty. A statutorily defined standard offers no greater
protection to both the victim and accused than the standards presently
articulated by the courts. The complete elimination of the need on the part
of the victim to prove resistance would appear to be the best solution.
V. PnIn SEXUAL CONDUCT OF THE VICTIM
The chastity of the rape victim has historically been a proper subject
of inquiry by the courts. Evidence of the victim's unchastity has been
admissible to show the probability of her consent and to impeach her
credibility. The introduction of such evidence into rape trials was
founded upon the nineteenth century view that an unchaste woman could
not be raped."" Despite a dramatic change in sexual mores, these out-
moded attitudes are still reflected in current judicial decisions.
When the defense to a charge of rape is consent, the general rule is
that evidence of the victim's reputation for unchastity is admissible. 119
The reasoning behind this rule is that it is more probable that an un-
chaste woman would assent to such an act than a virtuous woman.1 20 As
bearing on the question of consent, however, some jurisdictions admit not
only general reputation evidence but also evidence of specific acts tend-
ing to show want of chastity on the part of the prosecutrix.12' Though
this is the minority view, it is supported by Wigmore who, while pointing
out the conflict among the courts, concludes that the better rule admits
evidence of specific acts. 2 2  The response to Wigmore's position has
been that such testimony involves collateral issues that have no, direct
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 123  Other reasoning
7 id. at 685. The resistance standard which was proposed by the author was that "re-
sistance [be] at least as great as the maximum resistance a female could reasonably
offer to prevent penetration while avoiding serious risk of death or serious bodily
injury."
1s Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919,
939 (1973).
19 Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 380 (1942).
"o See People v. Cox, 383 I11. 617, 622, 50 N.E.2d 758, 760 (1943).
l See State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P.2d 416, 417 (1942); People v. Walker, 150 Cal.
App. 2d 594, 310 P.2d 110, 115 (1957); State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 260 N.W. 515,
516 (1935); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 35 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1949); Redmon v.
State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349, 351 (1948).
12 1 J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1940). A recent case comment supports the
minority view espoused by Wigmore but advocates that evidence of specific acts of the
victim's prior sexual conduct be admissible subject to the exercise of judicial discretion
out of the presence of the jury. This comment also advocates a total exclusion of
evidence of specific sexual acts when offered solely to impeach the victim's credibility.
8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974).
'23 See Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895).
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is not only concerned with the introduction of collateral issues but also
with the surprise element inherent in such evidence. 124 The prosecutrix,
though prepared to answer questions regarding her general reputation for
chastity and her specific sexual relationship with the accused, cannot rea-
sonably anticipate accusations and questions regarding specific sexual
acts with other men. In some jurisdictions, even general reputation evi-
dence is excluded when consent is not an issue.
125
In most states, under the rules of evidence, the veracity of the witness
is the only proper subject of inquiry for purposes of impeachment. In
general, these rules exclude evidence of other specific character traits.
An exception is made in cases of rape, however, where a few courts ad-
mit evidence of character for unchastity.1
26
Most courts agree that in prosecutions for rape, evidence of the victim's
prior sexual conduct with the accused is admissible. 127  Generally, such
evidence is admitted to raise an implication of consent and to reduce the
probability that the act was forcible. 28  The principle upon which evi-
dence of the victim's acts of intercourse with the defendant is admitted
was stated in Bedgood v. State:
29
124 [W]hile a prosecutrix, as a witness in an action of rape alleged to have been
committed upon her, is expected to defend her general reputation for chastity she
cannot anticipate the charges of specific acts of illicit intercourse which may be
made by men who perhaps have been suborned to testify that they have had such
connection with her, so as to secure the acquittal of the accused ...
State v. Ogden, 39 Ore. 195, 210, 65 P. 449, 454 (1901).
125 See Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Roper v. State, 375
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357, 517 P.2d 1315
(1974).
126 See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 640, 157 S.W. 1079 (1913); Redmon v.
State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948). In admitting such evidence in rape cases
the question has arisen as to whether the evidence is relevant as to both the victim's and
accused's credibility.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for
chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when
based upon that alone, while it does that of a woman. It is no compliment to a
woman to measure her character for truth by the same standard that you do that
of a man's, predicated upon character for chastity. What destroys the standing of
the one in all the walks of life has no effect whatever on the standing for truth of
the other.
State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 531-32, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895).
The concurring opinion rejected the bias of the majority apparent in the above
statement and argued that the same rule of evidence for impeaching the credibility of
testimony should apply whether the witness be male or female. Id. at 532-33, 33 S.W.
at 171-72 (concurring opinion). The bias of the majority view, however, finds support
in Wigmore who believed that the one situation in which chastity may have a direct
connection with veracity is when a woman charges a man with rape. 3A J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
127 See, e.g., Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d
613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
121 See Lee v. State, 132 Tenn. 655, 179 S.W. 145 (1915); Graham v. State, 125 Tex.
Crim. 210, 67 S.W.2d 296 (1933).
129 115 Ind. 275, 17 N.E. 621 (1888).
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[E]vidence of previous illicit commerce renders it probable that
force was not used. This principle has a two-fold effect, inas-
much as it affects the credit of the woman who charges that
her person was forcibly violated, and also supplies the accused
with a circumstance making it probable that he did not obtain
by violence what he might have secured by persuasion or for
money. It is, the rule assumes, not probable that a man who has
procured without committing a felony what he desired would
commit a felony to obtain it. A man accused of crime has a
right to all relevant testimony that tends to make it appear im-
probable that he is guilty of the crime with which he is
charged. 13 0
Although this principle was first articulated in 1888, it remains essen-
tially unchanged today.
Application of the above rules of evidence regarding the victim's prior
sexual conduct has, it is argued, often had the effect of placing the victim
on trial rather than the accused. This treatment of the rape victim has
had the following cyclical effect: rape victims are reluctant to report the
crime; without reporting there are no prosecutions and convictions; with-
out prosecutions and convictions, there is no deterrent to the crime; with-
out a deterrent, the incidents of rape continually increase; and finally,
though the number of rapes increases, victims remain unwilling to re-
port the crime. To break down this continuous cycle legislation to
change the rules of evidence with regard to the victim's prior sexual
activity has been enacted in thirteen states.','
The first state to enact a statute dealing with the admissibility of past
sexual conduct of the rape victim was Iowa. 132  The statute excludes
all evidence of such conduct with persons other than the defendant com-
mitted more than one year prior to the date of the alleged crime. 13 3 It
leaves to the court's discretion, however, upon a determination of rele-
vancy, the admissibility of all other evidence of prior sexual conduct -
130 Id. at 279, 17 N.E. at 623. In Bedgood, a case involving a rape by several men, the
court admitted evidence of prior sexual intercourse with one of the accused. In
People v. Degnen, 70 Cal. App. 567, 234 P. 129 (1925), however, a case involving a
rape by two men, both of whom had had prior intercourse individually with the victim,
the court refused to admit evidence of prior intercourse arguing that consent to inter-
course with each individually did not imply consent to an attack by both at the same
time.
131 CAL. EviD. CODE § 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1975); Colo H.B. 1042 § 18-3-407 (enacted
July 1, 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1975); Hawaii H.B. 106 § 1 (enacted
May 14, 1975); IowA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
750.520(j) (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975] Minn. Laws 1088; Nev. S.B. 222 §§ 2, 4
(enacted May 20, 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (interim Supp. 1975); Ohio Bill
§§ 2907.02(D), (E), (F); Ore. H.B. 2241 § 2 (enacted July 1, 1975); ch. 203, § 3, [1975]
Tex. Laws 477; ch. 14, § 2, [1975] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 171.
132 IowA CODE ANN. § 782 (Supp. 1975).
133 Id.
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such admissibility to be decided at an in camera hearing upon applica-
tion to the court by the defendant before or during trial.
134
Florida, in enacting its involuntary sexual battery statute, also ad-
mits evidence of specific instances of prior sexual activity between the
victim and the offender,'3 5 but specific instances of prior sexual activity
between the victim and persons other than the accused are not admis-
sible except when consent is in issue.1 36 In those circumstances, such
evidence may be admitted if the court at an in camera hearing deter-
mines that it tends to establish a pattern of behavior on the part of the
victim relevant to consent. 37 Unlike the Iowa statute, Florida's statute
restricts the discretion of the court in determining admissibility to the
issue of consent.
California in enacting the Robbins Rape Evidence Law,1 38 contempo-
raneously with Michigan, adopted a less restrictive evidentiary standard.
Opinion and reputation evidence and evidence of specific instances of the
victim's sexual conduct are inadmissible on the issue of consent unless such
conduct was with the defendant. 39 Evidence of the prior sexual con-
duct of the complaining witness, however, may be admissible on the is-
sue of credibility if determined relevant to the issue by the court at an
in camera hearing. 40 The court shall order such a hearing upon a written
motion made by the defendant and a sufficient offer of proof. 41 Evi-
dence of the character or a trait of character of the victim is admissible
if offered by the accused to prove conduct in conformity with such char-
acter or trait of character, or offered by the prosecution to rebut such
evidence of the defendant. 42
While not addressing the issue of consent, Hawaii followed California
in allowing evidence of sexual conduct of the complaining witness to be
admitted to attack the credibility of such witness subject to an in camera
hearing. 43
Nevada's evidentiary standard, on the other hand, admits evidence of
any previous sexual conduct of the victim for purposes of proving con-
sent, subject to an in camera hearing, but excludes such evidence for
purposes of impeaching credibility. 44 If, however, the prosecution has
introduced evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct or the victim
has testified concerning such conduct or its absence, the defense
may use this evidence to impeach the victim's credibility in cross-exami-
134 Id.
135 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1975).
136 Id.
137 Id.
131 CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1975).
139 Id. § 1103(2).
140 Id. § 782(a).
141 Id.
142 Id. § 1103(1).
'4 Hawaii H.B. 106 § 1 (enacted May 14, 1975).
144 Nev. S.B. 222 §§ 2, 4 (enacted May 20, 1975).
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nation or rebuttal, but only to the extent utilized by the prosecution or
victim. 145
Opinion and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and
evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual
conduct are presumed to be irrelevant under the new Colorado rape
law. 146 The two exceptions to this presumption are evidence of the vic-
tim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the accused and evidence
of specific instances of sexual activity to show source of semen, preg-
nancy, disease or any other similar evidence of sexual intercourse.
4 7
Evidence not included within the two exceptions and evidence that the
victim has a history of false reporting of rape may be admitted at trial
if found relevant to an issue material to the case at an in camera hear-
ing. 148
Relying on judicial discretion to assure the defendant's right to pre-
sent all relevant evidence while protecting the victim from evidence of
an inflammatory or prejudicial nature, New Mexico and Texas have
adopted legislation which conditions the admission of all evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct upon a determination at an in camera hearing of
its materiality. 49  This evidentiary standard is the one supported by
groups traditionally concerned with the protection of defendants' rights
since there is no absolute exclusion of any evidence which may have
probative value. Similarly, Minnesota requires an in camera hearing to
determine the admissibility of any evidence of the complainant's pre-
vious sexual conduct. 50 Unlike New Mexico and Texas, Minnesota qual-
ifies the circumstances under which such evidence can be used: (1)
when consent or fabrication by the victim is the defense if such evidence
shows a pattern of sexual conduct under similar circumstances occurring
within one year of the alleged offense; (2) evidence of specific instances
of sexual activity to show source of semen, pregnancy or disease; (3)
evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the accused; and (4)
for purposes of impeachment when such eviderce is offered to rebut the
victim's testimony.' 5'
The evidentiary standard enacted as part of Washington's rape reform
legislation admits evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior only on
the issue of consent and only when the perpetrator and the victim have
engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past. 52  Under
these circumstances, evidence including but not limited to the victim's
marital behavior, divorce history, reputation for promiscuity or sexual
145 Id. § 4.
146 Colo. H.B. 1042 § 18-3-407 (enacted July 1, 1975).
147 Id.
148 Id.
'4 N.M. STAT. ANN. .§ 40A-9-26 (interim Supp. 1975); ch. 203, § 3, [1975] Tex. Laws 477.
See 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 362 (1975) for an analysis of the Texas statute.
1-0 Ch. 374, § 8, [1975] Minn. Laws 1088.
151 Id.
152 Ch. 14, § 2, [1975] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 171.
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mores contrary to community standards may be admissible pursuant to
an in camera hearing.5 3  Taking the same approach as its neighbor-
ing state, Oregon admits evidence only for the purposes of negating forc-
ible compulsion, subject to an in camera hearing. 54 Unlike Washington,
Oregon limits the evidence on that issue to evidence or testimony of pre-
vious sexual conduct between the victim and accused.1
5 5
With the enactment of its new criminal sexual conduct law, Michigan
adopted the most stringent evidentiary standard for rape prosecution to
date. 1 6 This law excludes opinion and reputation evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual conduct and evidence of specific instances of the victim's
sexual conduct with two exceptions: evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the accused; and evidence of specific instances of sexual
intercourse for purposes of showing origin of semen, pregnancy or di-
sease.5 7  Evidence included in these two exceptions is admissible only
if within ten days after arraignment the defendant files a written mo-
tion and offer of proof. 158 The court at an in camera hearing may find
the evidence admissible only to the extent that it is "material to a fact
at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does
not outweigh its probative valve.' '
59
The rape reform legislation originally introduced in the Ohio legis-
lature incorporated an evidentiary standard identical to that enacted by
Michigan. As amended and as finally enacted, the Ohio statute retains
the Michigan standard except that it expressly stipulates that nothing
therein is to be interpreted as limiting or restricting the right of either
the state or the defense to impeach credibility. 6 ° It appears that the
evidentiary restriction enacted in Ohio does not fully protect the victim
from the defense's introduction of irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial
evidence. Although such evidence is not admissible to prove the substan-
tive element of consent, it is admissible to attack credibility. Thus, the
protection accorded the victim in one provision is taken away in another.
If the Ohio legislature was unwilling to enact the rigid standard original-
ly proposed, the more reasoned and equitable approach would have been
to adopt a standard similar to those of New Mexico and Texas. Neverthe-
less, the' Ohio legislature should be commended for the enactment of two
unique features in its evidentiary provision. These features are the ex-
tension of the evidentiary standard to the defendant's sexual conduct
and the allowance for counsel representing the victim to be present at
any evidentiary hearings.
61
15 Id.
15 Ore. H.B. 2241 § 2 (enacted July 1, 1975).
155 Id.
156 MiCm. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520(j) (Supp. 1975).
157 Id. § 750.520(j) (1).
,I- Id § 750.520(i) (2).
159 Id. § 750.520(i) (1).
160 Ohio Bill § 2907.02(D).
161 Id. §§ 2907.02(D), (F).
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With regard to the victim's prior sexual activity, proponents of the new
evidentiary standard begin their argument with the premise that as a
matter of substantive law, every person has a right to decline sexual ac-
tivity and to be protected by the law from unwanted intercourse. They
contend that the present body of judge-made laws fails miserably to guar-
antee these substantive rights and that it is time for state legislatures
to overcome the historical bias of these judicial decisions by enacting stat-
utes which focus on the protection of rape victims. Until very recently,
rape laws defined the crime as essentially involving a female victim and
a male defendant. As such, the evidentiary standards that developed
were founded on a basic suspicion of the female complainant's testimony.
Thus, courts admitted evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct not
only to show that consent was likely but also to impeach the victim's
credibility. Supporters of legislative reform allege that the admissibility
of evidence of the victim's past sexual life is totally irrelevant and imma-
terial to the issue of her consent to an act of forcible rape and to her credi-
bility as a witness in prosecuting the rape. The connection between her
chastity or lack of chastity and her consent and credibility is too atten-
uated to be given serious consideration.
As to the issue of consent, is it logical and reasonable to draw the
conclusion that a victim's consent to one act of sexual intercourse implies
consent to all other acts of a similar nature? If so, should not the same
logic and reasoning be applied to the defendant? Yet, though evidence
of the victim's prior sexual life is admissible to show that on the basis of
her unchastity she probably consented to the intercourse, evidence of the
defendant's prior sexual promiscuity cannot be used as a basis for infer-
ring his guilt. The implication of the above reasoning is that virgins and
faithful wives are deserving of the protection of the law while women who
may have had previous sexual encounters are unworthy of such protec-
tion. Because of the modern attitude toward sexual activity, the chastity
requirement today places significant numbers of women beyond the law's
protection. 162  It has been suggested that courts take judicial notice of
this attitude and consequently reject any attempt to introduce evidence
of unchastity into rape trials.1 3
Similarly, of what relevance is the victim's reputation for chastity to
her reputation for truth and veracity? If the rape laws regard the extra-
marital sexual activity of the rapist as irrelevant to his veracity, why
should the same activity of the victim be used to condemn her? Further-
more, is it logical to exclude evidence of the accused's criminal history,
i.e., evidence of past arrests and misdemeanor convictions, while admit-
ting evidence of the victim's entire sexual history?
It is not to be denied that the accused has the right to confront
his accuser, and that the credibility of the prosecuting witness and her
reputation for truthfulness are important. Nevertheless, any value to be
162 Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919,
939 (1973).
16 Id.
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gleaned from cross-examination of the witness as to her prior sexual ac-
tivity must surely be outweighed by the prejudicial nature of the evidence.
Although courts presently have the discretion to exclude evidence found to
be overly inflammatory and prejudicial, such a critical issue should not be
a matter of judicial discretion but should be precisely delineated by stat-
ute granting to all citizens, as a matter of public policy, protection
against such attacks on their personal integrity.
Proponents of rape reform legislation point out that the evidentiary
restrictions in no way interfere with the right of the accused to have
the benefit of the traditional safeguards against false charges - the bur-
den of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the evaluation of
credibility by the jury. Rape defendants will still have all the oppor-
tunities now accorded persons charged with other crimes, since reform
legislation will simply take away a right improperly given to rape defen-
dants alone - a right to make the victim's prior sexual conduct the key
to his defense and the deciding issue in the case.
164
Supporters of defendants' rights view the evidentiary restrictions as
impingements upon the accused's sixth amendment right to confront his
accuser. This right, granted to criminal defendants, has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court as being fundamental to a fair trial
and as including the right to cross-examine. 6 5 Accordingly, it is argued
that the defendant should not be precluded from fully cross-examining
the prosecutrix as to her prior sexual conduct - conduct relevant to her
consent and credibility. Since rape has traditionally been viewed as an
accusation easily made and difficult to refute, 16 and in light of the fact
that corroboration of the victim's testimony is in most jurisdictions not re-
quired, 167 the defendant should be accorded every opportunity to present
evidence relevant to his innocence.
The logical conclusion of the confrontation argument is that if the
criminal defendant has the right to confront and cross-examine his ac-
cuser, no state can enact a statute that infringes upon that right. In sup-
port of this conclusion, advocates of defendants' rights cite Davis v.
Alaska,16 a case in which a state statute prohibiting a criminal defen-
dant from cross-examining a juvenile witness about the juvenile's crim-
inal record was found to violate due process. The United States Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right to cross-examine to the extent
required to reveal bias on the part of an adverse witness is so vital a right
that it cannot yield to a state policy interest in protecting the confiden-
tiality of a juvenile offender's record.169 It is unreasonable, however, to
analogize the relevance of prior criminal conduct to the relevance of prior
164 V. Nordby, Legal Effects of Proposed Rape Reform Bills 15, April, 1974.
'65 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
166 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN § 635 (1847).
17 For a detailed discussion of the corroboration requirement see section VI.
1- 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
169 Id. For further discussion see Criminal Procedure, Review of Selected 1974 California
Legislation, 6 PACIFIc L. J. 261, 261-66 (1975).
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sexual conduct in determining the credibility of the prosecutrix. Evi-
dence of prior criminal conduct is surely a more valid reason for reject-
ing the credibility of a witness than is evidence of prior sexual conduct. 170
Davis fails to provide a strong constitutional argument against restrict-
ing the admissibility of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct in a
rape trial.
VI. CORROBORATION
Corroboration of the victim's testimony is a requirement unique to
the crime of rape. At common law, in crimes against the chastity of a
woman, the testimony of the prosecutrix was sufficient by itself to support
a conviction, 17 1 with perjury being the only crime requiring corrobora-
tion. 172  The majority of jurisdictions by judicial decision adhere to this
principle, 173 but a few states by statute174 or judicial decision 17 have
rejected the common law principle and require corroboration to sustain a
conviction for rape.
Although the majority of states follow the common law principle and
flatly reject the need for any corroboration, some states apply a qualified
corroboration requirement, 176 where the testimony of the prosecutrix is
not clear and convincing, 177 is contradictory, 17 is improbable or incred-
ible, 179 or where the prosecutrix does not make a prompt complaint.'"0
In view of the fact that corroboration of the victim's testimony is re-
quired only in rape trials and thus seems to reflect a societal bias against
rape victims, 181 (a bias which is in conflict with the present belief in the
principle of full equality of women in society) several states have enacted
statutes completely eliminating the corroboration requirement. Seven
states have enacted laws stating that the testimony of a rape victim need
not be corroborated;8 2 Florida, however, allows the court to instruct
170 See Criminal Procedure, Review of Selected 1974 California Legislation, 6 PACIFIC L.J.
261,264 (1975).
171 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061 at 342 (3d ed. 1940).
172 Id. § 2040(a) at 273.
173 Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365,
1367 (1972).
114 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1971).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 477 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Fisher, 190
Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d 568 (1973).
176 See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, supra note 173.
177 See, e.g., Truluck v. State, 108 So. 2d 748, 750 (Fla. 1959); People v. Simental, 11
I11. App. 3d 537, 541, 297 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1973).
178 See, e.g., State v. Neal, 484 S.W.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1972).
179 See, e.g., State v. Dipietrantonio, 152 Me. 41, 122 A.2d 414 (1956); May v. State, 89
Nev. 277, 510 P.2d 1368 (1973); Foster v. State, 308 P.2d 661 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App.
1957).
ISO See, e.g., People v. Reese, 14 I11. App. 3d 1049, 303 N.E.2d 814 (1973); Wright v. State,
364 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
181 According to the traditional definition a rape victim must be female.
182 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(5) (Supp. 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(h)
(Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975] Minn. Laws 1088; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-25
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the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence.8 3 New
York's statute provides that a defendant charged with forcible rape can
be convicted solely on the testimony of the complainant except when the
alleged victim is deemed by law to be incapable of consent.8 4 The New
York statute repealed a corroboration requirement which essentially
served to nullify rape prosecutions.'8 5  Similarly, two other states have
repealed statutes requiring corroboration but without simultaneously en-
acting statutes stipulating that corroboration would not be required.
8
The major justifications advanced in favor of an exceptional corrob-
oration requirement in rape trials include: the likelihood of false
charges of rape; the emotional impact of such a charge on a jury; and
the difficulty in disproving a charge of rape. Proponents of reform legis-
lation argue that none of these justifications has any validity in that ade-
quate documentation in support thereof has never been presented. They
argue further that rape laws, judicial decisions, and legal literature have
all been dominated by the fear that innocent men will be convicted of
false charges of rape, an inordinate fear stemming from a long-standing
sexual bias:
The false complaint is feared more in rape cases [than in other
crimes] because of the basic assumptions that many women are
either amoral or hostile to men and that women can induce rape
convictions solely by virtue of fabricated reports.
87
The result of this bias is that extraordinary protection has been provided
for persons accused of sex offenses, as exemplified by the corroboration
requirement.
The basis for the corroboration requirement can be found in the state-
ment of Wigmore in his treatise on evidence. Relying essentially on a
meager sampling of psychiatric case studies, Wigmore concluded that
there is a female propensity for falsifying charges of sexual offenses by
men.188  Because of his fear of falsified rape charges and his belief that
(interim Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1975); ch. 203, § 6, [19751
Tex. Laws 479; ch. 14, § 2, [19751 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 171.
183 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(1) (Supp. 1975).
is4 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1975) (the victim is under seventeen years of age
or is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated).
1s5 See Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New York,
36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 378 (1970); Hechtman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.16 (McKinney 1975).
186 1969 Conn. Public Act 828, § 69 (effective 1971, repealed 1974); Acts of 25th Iowa
General Assembly (1894), ch. 100, § 782.4 (repealed 1974).
1s7 Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 931
(1973).
s 3A J. WimM, EVIDENCE § 924a at 736 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). Wigmore states:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and
women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes
are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased de-
rangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly
by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these
complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men. The
1975]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
juries would be more sympathetic to the victim, Wigmore advocated that
a conviction for rape never be based solely on the testimony of the com-
plaining witness, and that no court allow a rape case to be presented to
a jury until the complainant's social history and mental makeup had been
examined and testified to by a qualified physician.18 9
Although the scientific evidence on which Wigmore based his proposi-
tion is now outdated and the statements of both Wigmore and the author-
ities he cites are blatantly biased, 190 Wigmore's treatise is the one most
often cited for the argument that the prosecutrix's accusations, without
more, are insufficient to sustain a rape conviction. Wigmore's advocacy
of the requirement of psychiatric examinations of all complainants in rape
cases also finds some support today,"9 but others contend that since such
a requirement finds no basis in the documentation of the frequency of
false rape charges, rape complainants should be subjected to psychiatric
examination only when the need is indicated.
192
unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direci expression in the
narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the
victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real
victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and
sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy
credit to such a plausible tale. Id.
1'9 Id. § 924a at 737. It is to be noted that while Wigmore is the most frequently cited
authority in support of the corroboration requirement, Wigmore was, in fact, opposed to
this requirement:
The fact is that, in the light of modern psychology, this technical rule of cor-
roboration seems but a crude and childish measure, if it be relied upon as an
adequate means for determining the credibility of the complaining witness in
such charges.
7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061 at 354 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore's position was that
every complaining witness in a rape case should be subjected to a psychiatric examina-
tion to determine her mental makeup.
190 Dr. Otto Midnkemibller's observations concerning the problems encountered with the
female witness in sex offense cases are as follows:
The most dangerous witnesses in prosecutions for morality offenses are the
youthful ones (often mere children) in whom the sex instinct holds the foremost
place in their thoughts and feelings. This intensely erotic propensity often can be
detected in the wanton facial expression, the sensuous motions, and the manner
of speech. But on the other hand one must not be deceived by the madonna-like
countenance that such a girl can readily assume; nor by the convincing upturn
of the eyes, with which she seeks to strengthen her credibility. To be sure, the
coarse sensuousness of her demeanor, coupled with a pert and forward manner,
usually leaves no doubt about her type of thought. Even in her early years can
be seen in countenance and demeanor the symptoms of the hussy-type, which in
later years enable one at first glance to recognize the hardened prostitute.
With profuse falsities they shamelessly speak of the coarsest sex-matters ...
When the sex-urge is strongly developed, then if some man comes within their
vicinity, they may dally with a secret wish to have some sex-relation with him,
and then his most harmless conduct is transformed by these sex-imaginative
witnesses into acts which charge him as a criminal . . . . In male youths this
particular sex disposition plays a far smaller part.
DR. OTro MSNEra&LERa, Psychology and Psychopathology of Testimony, 333 (1930),
cited in 3A WIcMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 743-44 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). The work
has apparently never been translated into English.
191 See, e.g., 43 IOWA L. REv. 650 (1958).
192 B. BABCOCK, A. FREEsMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 860 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK].
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The implication of the corroboration requirement is that there are no
pre-trial procedures for eliminating false charges of rape. Although there
may be instances of fabricated or exaggerated charges, the whole crim-
inal process is designed to screen out such charges long before trial.
93
In fact, the likelihood of false rape charges is probably no higher, and may
actually be lower, than in the case of other crimes, since the "disincen-
tives" are so overwhelming and the incentives, if any, are minimal.
194
Thus, to require corroboration only in these cases and not in all cases of
violent crime on the basis of the false charge argument is totally unjusti-
fied.
The argument that juries tend to sympathize with the victim of an al-
leged rape is based on a belief that a charge of rape raises such intense
emotions that the jury cannot be relied on to be fair and impartial. One
commentator has suggested that in the case of rape, "[t]he presumption
of innocence to which a defendant is entitled may give way to . .. the
unreasoning rage which many feel toward one accused of both violence
and indecency.'1 9, No documented evidence, however, supports this
theory and, as in the case of the false charge argument, the only author-
ity cited is Wigmore. 95
The facts negate this argument. A well-documented study of the func-
tioning of the American jury system points unequivocally to the opposite
conclusion.197  Kalven and Zeisel found, in analyzing jury reaction to
crimes other than rape, that judges would have reached the same conclu-
sion as the jury in seventy-five percent of the cases.' 98  In cases of sim-
ple rape, 99 however, there was agreement between the judge and jury
only forty percent of the time with the judge convicting and the jury
193 [T]he elaborate screening through which charges of rape pass starting with often
disbelieving or cynical police, through grand juries and prosecutors, makes it
somewhat unlikely that many false charges would even get to the trial stage,
much less survive cross-examination at trial to lead to conviction. Id. at 859.
194 Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365
(1972). Some of the disincentives to making a charge of rape are
the stigma that attach to the victim of an incident culturally defined as
sordid, and the humiliation caused by some forms of publicity associated with
such charges. Also to be considered are the necessity of confronting the
assailant and the reluctance to face the barbs and insinuations of the defense
attorney. There is, in addition, the fear of retaliation from the accused rapist
or his friends. Finally, there is the deterrent effect of the existence of the
corroboration requirement itself, at least to the extent that a potential com-
plainant may be aware of it. Id. at 1374.
195 Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1967).
116 3A J. WIcMoaE, EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
197 H. KALVEN & H. ZEsEL, THE AMaicAN Juny (1966). Kalven and Zeisel conducted a
study of the operation of the American jury by analyzing judge and jury reaction in
3,576 criminal jury trials. The method used in their jury study was to ask trial judges,
by mail questionnaire, to report how the jury decided the case and how they would have
decided it, and to give some descriptive and evaluative material about the case, the
parties, and the attorneys.
118 Id. at 56.
119 Id. at 252. Kalven and Zeisel define simple rape as those cases in which there is no
evidence of extrinsic violence, or in which there is only one assailant or in which the
defendant and victim are not complete strangers.
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acquitting in sixty percent of the cases. 200 Kalven and Zeisel concluded
that in cases in which there were no aggravating circumstances, juries
tended to be more critical of the victim and would infer an assumption of
risk.201 In such cases, juries appeared to be reluctant to attach the dis-
tinctive stigma of a rape charge to the defendant, and when there was no
option to finding the defendant guilty of a lesser crime, the jury would
usually choose acquittal rather than find the defendant guilty of
rape.20 2 The study lends support to the view that no bias to convict exists,
but even if such bias does exist, it has been suggested that there are more
effective ways of dealing with the problem: the protection afforded by the
fourteenth amendment; a change of venue if local prejudice is found; and
the duty of the courts to set aside the verdict of an obviously biased
jury. 203
The third justification offered in support of the corroboration require-
ment is that a charge of rape is difficult to disprove. In fact, a charge of
rape is no more difficult to defend against than a charge of any other
crime. There still is the presumption that the accused is innocent and
the burden of proof is still on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Since in rape cases there are usually no eyewitnesses
and testimony is thus limited to that of the prosecutrix, it is essentially
the word of the victim against that of the accused. It has even been
argued that it is much easier to defend against a rape charge than to prose-
cute one, since, if a victim can manage to overcome the obstacles pre-
sented by the criminal justice system to get her case to trial, she will still
have to face a notoriously unsympathetic jury. To additionally require
corroboration only in cases of rape is unjustified.20 4
A final argument that should be presented in opposition to the corrob-
oration requirement is one that favors neither the prosecutrix nor the
accused. This argument represents a valid concern that the corrobo-
ration requirement is a potential deterrent to the effective functioning of
the trial process. As a mere "rule of thumb" it is no substitute for a
thorough examination into the credibility of the complaining witness. 20 1
Such a requirement if mechanically applied may in fact distract the jury
from its primary responsibility of determining the credibility of the wit-
ness.20 6 Thus, instead of providing an additional safeguard for the de-
fendant and an additional obstacle for the complainant, the corrobora-
00 Id. at 253.
201 Id. at 254.
20 Id.
203 Michigan Women's Task Force, supra note 82, at 10.
2o4 Id. at 11.
205 Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New York, 36
BROOKLYN L. REV. 378 (1970).
206 If the complaining witness in a sex offense lacks sufficient credibility in any re-
spect, no amount of other evidence can compensate for that deficiency. If the
complaining witness is completely credible, any other evidence is superfluous
and should be unnecessary. Id. at 383.
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tion requirement may produce the opposite result and should be
eliminated.
VII. SENTENCING
The purpose of enforcing the criminal law is to deter aberrant be-
havior, and sentencing is the primary means of achieving this desired ef-
fect. As applied to the crime of rape, sentencing reflects a peculiar so-
cietal ambivalence. Because rape is viewed as a particularly repugnant
crime, the sentences imposed on those found guilty are especially harsh,
but ironically it appears that the very harshness of the sentences has
made juries reluctant to convict and courts reluctant to sentence.
At the present time, there are at least thirty states which provide a
possible life sentence for rape while many other jurisdictions impose
maximum sentences of thirty, forty or fifty years.20 7 At least two states
provide a minimum sentence of five years208 whereas others provide
for both imprisonment and the payment of substantial fines.20 9 Prior
to the decisions by the United States Supreme Court establishing that a
discretionary death penalty is in violation of the eighth amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment,210 sixteen states provided a death penalty
for rape.21' Since these decisions, at least one state has enacted a stat-
ute providing for a mandatory death sentence for rape.2 12 A decision
on the constitutionality of a mandatory death sentence is presently pend-
ing.213
Rape reform legislation appears not to address itself to the question
of whether the severity of the penalties imposed is a factor significantly
contributing to the lack of convictions for rape. Rather, legislation seems
to be concerned primarily with judicial discretion in sentencing by pro-
viding for minimum mandatory sentences for either first or subsequent of-
fenses. Michigan and Ohio have recently enacted legislation providing
for a minimum mandatory sentence of not less than five years for a second
or subsequent offense. 214
Minnesota has enacted similar legislation which provides for a minimum
mandatory sentence of at least three years or successful completion of
a treatment program for antisocial sexual behavior for a second or sub-
sequent offense occuring within fifteen years of the prior conviction.215
207 BABCOCK, supra note 192, at 863 n.56.
208 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.010 (Supp.
1974).
209 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-3(B) (1953).
210 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court, however, did not address itself to
the issue of whether the death penalty for rape was a punishment disproportionate to the
crime.
z BABCOCK, supra note 192, at 863 n.57.
212 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Supp. 1974).
213 Fowler v. North Carolina, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E,2d 803, cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963
(1974), wherein the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death. Restored to calender for reargument, - U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 2652 (1975).
214 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(f) (Supp. 1975); Ohio Bill § 2907.10.
215 Ch. 374, § 7, [1975] Minn. Laws 1087.
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Washington is the only state which has recently enacted reform legisla-
tion with a minimum mandatory sentence for first offenders. 219
If the purpose of enforcing the criminal law is to deter aberrant be-
havior and if sentencing is the means by which the deterrent effect is
applied, then a sentence meted out for any crime should satisfy two
standards: it should be proportionate to the crime committed; and it should
be sufficiently harsh to achieve the deterrent effect and yet not so harsh
that juries are reluctant to convict. If the severity of the sentence is such
that it negates the possibility of conviction, it is obvious that the deter-
rent effect will not be upon the criminal but rather upon the jury. The
counter argument raised is that this deterrent effect upon juries does not
exist since juries are not reluctant to convict when there are aggravating
circumstances or when the victim and accused are of different races.
2 17
Since the majority of rapes do not involve aggravating circumstances or
persons of different races, 18 it can still be argued that it is in fact the
existence and possible imposition of harsh penalties that is the basis of the
disinclination of juries to convict.
Thus, it appears that the focus of rape reform legislation is somewhat
misplaced. Perhaps reformers should be concerned not with curbing ju-
dicial discretion but with removing the obstacle to juries justly convicting
those guilty of rape. Rather than focusing on the establishment of mini-
mum mandatory sentences for first or subsequent offenses, legislation
should reduce the maximum sentences now provided to a level propor-
tionate to the gravity of the offense.219
VIII. IDENTIFICATION OF RAPE VIcrIMs
In an effort to protect the reputation of the victim of a rape, four states
sought by statute to proscribe any publication of the name or identity of
the victim. 2 0  These broadly drawn statutes prohibiting dissemination of
such information provided that any person found guilty of violating the
statutes shall be punished as for a misdemeanor. In its decision of
216 Ch. 14, § 4, [1975] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 172. Washington has established a
minimum mandatory sentence of three years for first offenders.
217 BABCOCK, supra note 192, at 868.
218 A number of studies have shown that most rapes are intraracial. The President's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, for instance, found in its 1966 survey
of serious crimes that eighty-eight percent of rapes involved persons who were of the
same race. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JusTiCE, THE CHALLENGE OF CIUNE IN A FREE SOCIETY 40 (1967).
219 BABCOCK, supra note 192, at 869.
Realistically and fairly, efforts . . . to abolish the special rules concerning the
trial of rape cases should be accompanied by a reassessment of the penalty for
the crime. If the penalty were brought into line with that for aggravated assaults
in most jurisdictions, there would be less need felt for special evidentiary rules
and instructions to protect the accused against the risk of too high a penalty
in comparison to the crime. Lowering the penalties should in itself increase the
conviction rate because juries will no longer be overly concerned with the pos-
sible drastic consequences of conviction. Id.
220 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-81 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1958).
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March 3, 1975, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,2 ' the United States
Supreme Court found such statutes to be in violation of the first and
fourteenth amendments. In that case, the father of a rape victim, who
did not survive the incident, brought an action for damages relying on
Georgia law 222 alleging that his right to privacy had been invaded.
The action was based on the identification of the victim during television
coverage of the trial of the alleged rapists. The reporter covering the
trial for the defendant broadcasting company obtained the name of the vic-
tim from the indictments which were made available for public inspec-
tion in the courtroom. In finding the Georgia statute unconstitutional
the Supreme Court held that a state may not impose sanctions on the
publication of the name of a rape victim when it is obtained from public
records.22 3 The Court reasoned that there is no invasion of the right to
privacy when the information involved already appears on a public rec-
ord, a conclusion compelled not only by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments but also by the public interest in maintaining a vigorous press.
As a result of the Cox decision those statutes absolutely prohibiting
publication of the identity of rape victims are no longer constitutional.
Statutes recently enacted in Michigan 224 and Ohio,225 qualify the pro-
scription on publication. The Michigan statute provides that the counsel,
the victim or the accused may request the court to suppress the details
of the alleged crime and the names of the victim and the accused; this
suppression will continue until arraignment, dismissal of the charge, or
conclusion of the case, whichever occurs first. 226 Ohio's statute is sub-
stantially the same as Michigan's except that it contains two additional
provisions: the preliminary hearing is added to the events prior to which
suppression is required and neither party is to be denied the name and
address of the other party or the details of the offense charged. 2 7 Since
the Supreme Court in Cox addressed itself specifically to the issue of the
publication of information already in a public record, it would appear
that the Michigan and Ohio statutes are not in violation of the first and
fourteenth amendments since the information suppressed is not yet part
of the public record. These two statutes can be further distinguished
221 - U.S. _ 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
222 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish,
broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public dis-
semination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or
disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publication
published in this state or through any radio or television broadcast originating
in the state the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or
upon whom any assault with intent to commit rape may have been made. Any
person or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon convic-
tion, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
223 - U.S. _ _ 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1044 (1975).
224 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(k) (Supp. 1975).
225 Ohio Bill § 2907.11.
226 Micn. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520(k) (Supp. 1975).
227 Ohio Bill § 2907.11.
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from those held unconstitutional in two respects: first, no specific sanc-
tion is provided; and second, the reputations of the victim and the accused
are sought to be protected as a matter of public policy.
The argument supporting the suppression of the identities of the victim
and the accused is reasonable in light of the opprobrium attached to rape.
Premature identification of either party could not only subject the victim
to unnecessary humiliating publicity and to the threat of possible physi-
cal harm but also cause irreparable damage to the reputation of the ac-
cused. Suppression of such information prior to arraignment should be
not only within the bounds of the first and fourteenth amendments but
also within the power of the state to legislate for the protection of its
citizens.
IX. MEDICAL CARE
A unique feature of the crime of rape is that the most convincing
evidence can often be obtained only by a physical examination of the
victim. Although the evidence obtained from such an examination is
subsequently used by the prosecution, the cost of gathering such evidence
in most states is incurred by the victim. Advocates of reform in this area
of rape law argue that since the prosecution is conducted by the state
which assumes all the other expenses involved therein, the cost of the
physical examination of the victim should also be borne by the state.
The interest in this aspect of reform appears to be quite limited at the
present time. California, Minnesota, Nevada, and Ohio enacted statutes
which specifically provide that no costs incurred for the examination of
the victim of a sexual assault, when such examination is performed for
purposes of gathering evidence for possible prosecution, shall be charged
to the victim of such assault.228 These statutes assign the cost of such
treatment to the appropriate local governmental agency, i.e., to the county
or municipality in whose jurisdiction the alleged offense was com-
mitted.229 Nevada, in addition, provides that any cost incurred by a hos-
pital for the initial emergency medical care of a rape victim shall be
charged to the county in which the rape occurred. 230 Among these four
states Ohio is unique in that it provides for medical examination of minor
rape victims without parental consent.2 31
Illinois is the only state to date which has enacted a statute providing
that hospitals furnishing emergency medical service to rape victims are
to be reimbursed by the Department of Public Health. 232 This "Rape
Victims Emergency Treatment Act" requires the participation of every
hospital licensed by the state but provides that such participation may be
92 CAL. GOVT CODE § 13961.5 (West Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 11, [1975] Minn. Laws
1089; Nev. S.B. 222 § 8 (enacted May 20, 1975); Ohio Bill § 2907.28.
229 CAL. GovT CODE § 13961.5 (West Supp. 1975).
230 Nev. S.B. 222 § 8 (enacted May 20, 1975).
231 Ohio Bill § 2907.29.
232 I11. H.B. 271 § 2 (enacted August 26, 1975).
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in conjunction with one or more other hospitals in an areawide or com-
munity plan approved by the Illinois Department of Public Health.2 33
The Act further provides the minimum requirements for the treatment and
services offered rape victims. 34 Illinois has also enacted statutory pro-
visions prohibiting the exclusion of coverage for the treatment of injuries
of rape victims in accident and health insurance policies and in hospital
service plans.
235
An enabling act recently adopted by the state of Nevada allows coun-
ties to adopt ordinances providing for medical treatment and counseling
not only for rape victims but also for their spouses. 236 Treatment in the
form of psychological, psychiatric and marital counseling shall be made
available to victims and spouses with costs not exceeding $1,000 to be
paid by the county. 23
7
The legislation recently enacted in Minnesota was introduced subse-
quent to the enactment of a statute requiring the Commissioner of Cor-
rections to develop a statewide program to aid victims of sexual attack. 238
This enabling statute represents the broadest public policy statement to
date in support of the rape victim. The statute gives the Commissioner
authority to develop a community based program which may assume all
costs of any medical examination and treatment the victim may require,
whether or not the information obtained from such examination will be
used in a prosecution, provided that the victim is not otherwise reim-
bursed for these expenses. 239 Such a program may also include volun-
tary counseling by trained personnel who are able to inform the victim
of the possibility of contracting venereal disease, the possibility of preg-
nancy, the expected emotional reactions and any other relevant informa-
tion.240 Moreover, the focus of the legislation goes beyond merely pro-
viding adequate medical care. It is clear that the legislative intent is to
insure sensitive and understanding assistance to the victim at every phase
of the rape prosecution. Thus, in addition to developing the program,
the Commissioner is to encourage the implementation of the public pol-
icy in support of rape victims by: urging the assignment of prosecuting
attorneys sensitive to rape victims; urging the assignment of trained peace
officers of the same sex as the victim to conduct all necessary questioning
of the victim; and urging hospital administrators to place rape victims in
a position of high priority.24'
Whether the program will ever develop and if developed whether it
can be successfully administered is unknown at the present time. Since
233 Id. §§ 2, 3, 4.
234 Id. § 5.
235 111. H.B. 278 (enacted August 26, 1975).
21' Nev. A.B. 664 § 4 (enacted May 21, 1975).
237 Id. § 5.
231 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 241.51-.53 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
239 Id. § 241.51(3)(b).
240 Id. § 241.51(3)(a).
241 Id. § 241.52.
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a major factor contributing to the failure of the effective administration
of the rape laws is the lack of a strong public policy supporting the rape
victim, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the development and im-
plementation of a program similar to the one recommended by the Minne-
sota legislature will dramatically increase both the number of rapes re-
ported and the number of rapes successfully prosecuted.
X. INTEREST GROUPS
The major impetus for rape reform legislation has come from various
interest groups across the country. Although the groups whose positions
are discussed below are in essential agreement with the need for reform
legislation, i.e., that the inadequacy of present rape laws is directly re-
sponsible for the failure of the effective administration of the criminal law
as it applies to rape, they differ in their approach to the problem. While
some feel that certain aspects of the enacted and proposed legislation
have inherent constitutional infirmities, others contend that even more
stringent measures must be taken if reform legislation" is to fully encom-
pass the problem.
Michigan was the first state to enact comprehensive rape legislation
largely through the efforts of the Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape.
In the belief that "the threat of rape now constitutes a major infringe-
ment on the civil liberties of all citizens"2 42 and that existing laws pro-
vide little protection or deterrent against rape, the Women's Task Force
drafted a proposal, many aspects of which have been incorporated into
the new Michigan law. Their argument for prompt legislative action rec-
ognizes that in the final analysis only state legislatures can establish a
public policy in support of the rape victim. Although the controversial
nature of the rape problem lends itself to endless discussion, deliberation
and delay, the certainty that hundreds of people will be assaulted while
the assaulters continue to go virtually free from any threat of conviction
far outweighs the uncertain benefits of more years of deliberation. 243
The American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio on the other hand urges
that the most effective rape reform legislation can only be obtained by care
and deliberation at the drafting stage. They argue that in the long run
carefully drafted statutes that will withstand constitutional tests justify
temporary delay in enactment since such statutes will protect the rights
of both the victim and accused.
In its traditional role as a defender of the rights of the accused, the
Ohio ACLU objects to the enactment of rape laws which totally exclude
evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct. They argue that such laws
exclude evidence which may be relevant and necessary for an adequate
confrontation by the defendant of his accuser. Such an exclusion pre-
cludes a number of circumstances in which evidence of prior sexual con-
242 Michigan Women's Task Force, supra note 82, at 1.
243 Id.
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duct is absolutely material, for example, where a pattern and practice
of extortionary conduct by the victim is alleged.244
In support of its position, the Ohio ACLU cites Chambers v. Missis-
sippi,245 Davis v. Alaska,24' and State v. Cox, 247 all indicative of the
proposition that the exclusion of relevant and material evidence violates
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Chambers, the
United States Supreme Court held that the exclusion as hearsay of testi-
mony as to the confession of a third party to the crime for which the de-
fendant was being tried deprived the defendant of a fair trial.2 4 In
Davis, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute protecting the con-
fidentiality of a juvenile offender's record declaring that no state statute
can interfere with the defendant's constitutional right to effectively cross-
examine an adverse witness for bias.249 Citing the decision in Davis, the
Ohio Supreme Court in Cox recently struck down a similar state statute
holding that such enactments may not impinge upon a criminal defen-
dant's right to present all available, relevant and probative evidence which
is pertinent to a specific and material aspect of the defense. 251 With-
holding evidence of a prior admission of guilt or evidence of a juvenile
record is, however, most assuredly not analogous to withholding evidence
of a victim's prior sexual conduct. To apply the rationale of the above
decisions to evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct in rape trials is to
ignore the basic differences between the two types of evidence. The
relevancy and materiality of a prior confession or of a prior juvenile rec-
ord for purposes of showing bias or lack of credibility is not equivalent to
that of a rape victim's sexual history. The conclusion that the law cannot
exclude evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct, except with the de-
fendant, is unsupportable.
The Ohio ACLU, relying on unbiased judicial discretion, proposes
that all such evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct be admissible
subject to an in camera hearing and to the limitation that the evidence be
sufficiently connected with a material fact in the case to make it relevant
244 Memorandum from Benson A. Wolman, Executive Director of American Civil Liberties
Union of Ohio to Members of the Ohio Senate Judiciary Committee concerning Substi-
tute S.B. 144, June 24, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. Another circumstance
in which evidence of sexual conduct is viewed as absolutely essential is when a defense
of consent is raised. One commentator has argued that statutes restricting the
admissibility of evidence of the victim's sexual conduct impede the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, and that in order to satisfy
this constitutional requirement proponents of such statutes must establish proof that
there is no rational connection between the complainant's sexual history and the likeli-
hood of her consent to intercourse on any occasion. This commentator actually believes
that such proof can be obtained by the commissioning of a panel of "reliable, impartial
social scientists" to determine whether or not a woman's sexual history has any bearing
on the probability of her consent.
245 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
246 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
247 42 Ohio St. 2d 200, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975).
248 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
249 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
250 42 Ohio St. 2d 200, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975).
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and material. 2 1 Furthermore, the defendant is to have the same oppor-
tunity to resort to an in camera hearing on the admissibility of his prior
sexual activity in order to satisfy the requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause and the spirit of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment ratified by the Ohio General Assembly.252 Proponents of a total
exclusion of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct argue that judi-
cial discretion has traditionally been biased against the rape victim, and
that in most cases highly prejudicial and inflammatory evidence which is
neither relevant nor material is admitted. It is to correct such abuse of
discretion that stringent evidentiary restrictions should be enacted. A
compromise position, suggested by one commentator, would allow all evi-
dence of sexual conduct to be admissible subject to an in camera hearing
where the scope of judicial discretion has been established by statutory
guidelines. 253 Such an approach would insure the protection of the de-
fendant's constitutional right to an effective cross-examination while pro-
tecting the victim from the introduction of embarrassing and immaterial
evidence.
Another area of rape reform legislation in which the Ohio ACLU
finds an inherent constitutional infirmity is the suppression of the names
of the victim and the accused and the details of the alleged rape at the
request of either party at least until after the preliminary hearing or ar-
raignment. 254 The ACLU contends that such a provision is within the
holding of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn2 55 and violates the first
amendment right to publish information which is part of the public rec-
ord.2 56  To correct such a constitutional defect the Ohio ACLU pro-
poses that only the address of the victim be suppressed and that the
name of the victim be released to the media.251 Such a modification
unfortunately dilutes the purpose of the identification provision which is
to protect both the victim and accused from adverse publicity. Further-
more, as noted previously, it would appear that the decision in Cox does
not render this provision unconstitutional on its face since the information
temporarily withheld is not yet part of the public record. In addition,
the ACLU argues that a statute which denies the defendant the right to
know the name and address of the victim and the details of the alleged
offense violates the constitutional right of the defendant to know the
identity of his accuser and the details of the charges against him until it
may be too late to prepare an adequate defense. 2-8 Thus, according to
the ACLU argument the identification provision of Michigan's new rape
251 Memorandum, supra note 244.
252 Id.
253 Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HAS-nNGS
L. J. 1551 (1975).
4 Micii. COMp. Laws ANN. § 750.520(k) (Supp. 1975); Ohio Bill § 2907.11.
255 __ U.S. _ 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
256 Memorandum, supra note 244.
257 Id.
258 Id.
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law is unconstitutional. Yet until the accused has been formally charged
at an arraignment, the preparation of a defense is premature. The main
objective of a statutory suppression of the victim's name and address un-
til arraignment is to protect the victim from the threat of possible physical
harm from the accused, a provision like Ohio's which accords either party
the name and address of the other party prior to that time nullifies the
effectiveness of such a statute.
The Ohio ACLU endorses the provisions of the new Ohio rape law
which make it unnecessary to prove resistance and which provide that
the victim should not pay the costs of a medical examination for the
purpose of gathering evidence.2 59 In addition, it was instrumental in the
enactment by the Ohio legislature of those provisions which apply the
evidentiary restriction to both the victim and the defendant, which al-
low for the medical examination of minor rape victims without parental
consent, and which establish the crime of felonious sexual penetration,
an offense which proscribes the vaginal or anal penetration by instrument
or object. The Ohio ACLU finds the recently enacted Ohio rape law in-
complete since it does not encompass every possible aspect of the rape
problem. The ACLU recommends that any state considering the enact-
ment of rape reform legislation should also address itself to the follow-
ing proposals: the elimination of the corroboration requirement; the es-
tablishment of uniform and humane evidence-gathering procedures; the
possibility that one spouse may bring a charge of rape against the other
spouse; the preservation of judicial discretion in sentencing; and the rep-
resentation of the rape victim by her own attorney if so desired through-
out the entire proceeding.2 60
As one of the major advocates of social and legal equality of women,
the National Organization for Women looks upon the revision of rape laws
as a necessary step in challenging the secondary position of women in our
society. A resolution submitted to the NOW National Board Meeting of
August 1974, set forth as its goal:
To revise the present laws which overwhelmingly favor the de-
fendant, impede convictions, allow victims, as witnesses, to be
treated in a manner which is both humiliating and damaging
to their emotional health, and which further discourages victims
from reporting the crime to the officials. 2 61
259 Id.
260 Id. In a press release of January 15, 1974, the New York Civil Liberties Union
endorsed the repeal of the statutory corroboration requirement in that state. In support
of its position, the NYCLU made the following statement:
If women were generally required to produce corroborating evidence in crimes
of which they complained, while men were not, that would be no less a violation
of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The corroboration requirement
for rape has the same effect because it disproportionately places a higher legal
burden upon women than upon men.
261 Resolution No. 20 on Rape, National Organization for Women National Board Meeting,
August 3-4, 1974.
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Added to its endorsement of a redefinition of spouse, the general revi-
sion of the present rules of evidence, and the inclusion within the defini-
tion of rape of the penetration by instrument or device, the distinctive
features of the NOW resolution are its provisions with regard to sentenc-
ing, penalties, rehabilitation and parole. The general approach of the
sentencing provision is to achieve a lowering of penalties except in gang
rapes so that the penalty fits the crime, thus making more likely the
possibility of conviction. In addition, to ensure that convictions will re-
sult in the serving of at least a minimum sentence, NOW proposes the
requirement that parole be granted only after the serving of one year for
the first offense and five years for the second offense, with intensive
rehabilitative counseling.2 62 Contending that the absence of meaningful
rehabilitation contributes to the high rate of recidivism among sex of-
fenders, NOW recommends an intensive psychiatric study of the convicted
rapist along with participation in an individualized rehabilitation program
by the rapist during incarceration and after parole.216 The NOW reso-
lution further advocates that the victim of a rape have the right to be
represented in court by counsel of her own choosing in order to fully pro-
tect her rights in possible subsequent civil proceedings.
264
Finally, additional support for rape reform legislation can be found in
a resolution adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in February 1975. Through the efforts of the Law Student
Division, 265 the ABA authorized its president to urge a redefinition of
262 Id.
263 Id. For a discussion of New Jersey's experience in implementing a comprehensive
rehabilitation program for sex offenders see Prendergast, Problems Encountered in the
Implementation of the Sex Offender Act by the Rahway Treatment Unit, 3 CRIM.
JUSTICE Q. 58 (1975).
'264 Id.
265 In testifying before the House of Delegates urging approval of a resolution calling for
a redefinition of rape, Connie K. Borkenhagen of Albuquerque, New Mexico, presented
an imaginary cross-examination of a robbery victim subjccted to the kind of cross-
examination that the rape victim usually must undergo:
"Mr. Smith, you were held up at gunpoint on the corner of First and Main?"
"Yes."
"Did you struggle with the robber?"
"No."
"Why not?"
"He was armed."
"Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his demands rather than
resist?"
"Yes."
"Did you scream? Cry out?"
"No. I was afraid."
"I see. Have you ever been held up before?"
"No."
"Have you ever given money away?"
"Yes, of course."
"And you did so willingly?"
"What are you getting at?"
"Well let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the
past. In fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure
that you weren't contriving to have your money taken from you by force?"
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rape in terms of "persons" instead of "women" and a revision of the
rules of evidence by: elimination of corroboration requirements exceed-
ing those applied to other crimes; revision of evidentiary rules as to
cross-examination of the prosecutrix; re-evaluation of penalties for rape;
development of new police and prosecutorial procedures in rape cases;
and establishment of rape treatment and study centers for purposes of
aiding both victim and offender. 26 6
Despite the strong endorsement for the enactment of rape reform leg-
islation from the ABA, both the Model Penal Code and the Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code still retain some of the objectionable features
of the old rape laws. Both codes include a corroboration requirement for
felonious sex offenses coupled with a special jury instruction that the testi-
mony of a rape victim should be evaluated with special care in view of
the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determin-
ing credibility with respect to alleged private sexual activities.267  In
the commentary following the proposed code the argument presented to
support these requirements is that there is an inherent danger of mistaken
conviction in rape - such danger occasioned perhaps by
the hysterical accusations of a spumed lover, and even the "spe-
cial psychological involvement, conscious or unconscious, of
judges and jurors in sex offenses charged against others. 268
The organizations whose views are discussed above represent only a
sampling of those interested in and working for the enactment of rape re-
form legislation. It is not to be implied that they have been the most in-
fluential in effecting rape reform. Rather, their positions are represen-
"Listen, if I wanted .... "
"Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr. Smith?"
"About 11:00 p.m."
"You were out on the street at 11:00 p.m.? Doing what?"
"Just walking."
"Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out on the street that
late at night. Weren't you aware that you could have been held up?"
"I hadn't thought about it."
"What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?"
"Let's see ... a suit. Yes, a suit."
"An expensive suit?"
"Well - yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know."
"In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around the streets late at
night in a suit that practically advertised the fact that you might be a good
target for some easy money, isn't that so? I mean, if we didn't know better,
Mr. Smith, we might even think that you were asking for this to happen mightn't
we?"
Quoted in 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975).
26 ABA Law Student Division Report No. 112, February 1975, in House of Delegates Rede-
fines Death, Urges Redefinition of Rape, and Undoes the Houston Amendments, 61
A.B.A.J. 463, 465 (1975).
267 UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
FINAL REPORT, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1648(5) (1971); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.6(6) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
218 UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WOMUrNC PAPERS Vol. II, at 875 (1970).
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tative of the views of many concerned individuals and organizations
throughout the country.
XI. CONCLUSION
The crime of rape is unique in that an excessively high standard of
proof is required to establish the commission of the crime and the guilt
of the accused. This standard places an undue burden on the rape vic-
tim and hinders effective rape prosecution. Rape reform legislation at-
tempts to equalize the standard of proof by granting rape victims the
same protection accorded victims of all other violent crimes. The most
compelling objection to the statutory reform of the rape laws is that in
extending equal protection to the rape victim the rights of the defendant
will be diminished. After analyzing all the arguments supporting and
challenging the enactment of rape reform legislation, it appears that the
overriding fear that the defendant's constitutional rights will be violated is
unfounded. And such an unfounded fear should not be the basis for
denying equal protection to the rape victim.
A more valid objection to the enactment of new rape laws is that
such legislation in and of itself cannot provide a total solution to the
rape problem. The validity of this objection lies in the fact that rape re-
form legislation does not address itself to the total problem and that rape
is partly a societal problem which cannot be legislated away.
Furthermore, the enactment of such legislation may lull those most
concerned with the problem into a false sense of security which will re-
sult in the failure to seek additional solutions, and additional solutions
must be found. Many problems not dealt with by the present legisla-
tion may be more detrimental to the effective prosecution of a rape case
than those sought to be cured by such legislation. Victims will still be
subjected to the same harassment, intimidation, and embarrassment dur-
ing pre-trial questioning as a result of police and prosecutorial bias, and
cases will continue to be dismissed because of police failure to conduct
the identification procedure in accordance with the requirements of the
rules of criminal procedure.
Moreover, present rape reform legislation fails to suggest practical
preventive measures for curbing the incidence of rape. Increased police
surveillance in high rape areas and housing codes delineating minimum
safety requirements in apartment buildings and public facilities exemplify
the types of safety measures that can be taken to reduce potential rapes.
Also, in recognition of the societal aspects of the rape problem evidenced
by its high rate of recidivism, rehabilitative programs providing individ-
ualized treatment for sex offenders must be developed.
Despite the fact that rape reform legislation does not provide a total
solution to the problem, it should be enacted since it will, at the very
least, establish a strong public policy in support of the rape victim. Such
a public policy should counteract the historical bias against rape victims
by giving notice that the rights of the rape victim will no longer be
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subordinated to those of the accused. This legislative mandate should
encourage not only the reporting of rapes but also the successful prose-
cution of those guilty.
HELENE SASKO
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